The new changes in SecureBootVariableLib brought in a new dependency of PlatformPKProtectionLib. This change added the new library instance from SecurityPkg to resolve U5SeriesPkg platforms

The new changes in SecureBootVariableLib brought in a new dependency of PlatformPKProtectionLib. This change added the new library instance from SecurityPkg to resolve RaspberryPi platforms

From: Kun <kuqin12@...> This v2 series is a follow up of previously submitted patches: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/91195 Compared to v1, v2 patches updated commit message to include

Ok, so the old MemoryFence() is definitely bogus here. However, it doesn't need to be an mfence instruction.  All that is needed is smp_mb(), which these days is asm volatile ( "lock addl $0,

I think the code style demands "L" is capitalised. <line break> I think you can use "@returns Whether file is a symlink", because strictly speaking you would require a "FALSE" case with this

In my opinion, just "to prevent truncation". This looks awkward, using an "EXT2" type in an "Ext4" function. Maybe just use UINT32? The comment is misleading, because this is safe for EXT4 as

Reviewed-by: Marvin Häuser <mhaeuser@...>

We shouldn't use direct casts, because in the future it could break the code, so using BASE_CR would be safe against possible structure changes and rearrangements Cc: Marvin Häuser

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3677 Provided support for symlink file type. Added routine which allows reading and following them through recursive open() call. As a

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3677 Hi all, In previous patchset I forgot to mention 3677 bug dedicated to symlinks. So in v2 I took it into account. This patchset adds symbolic

We shouldn't use direct casts, because in the future it could break the code, so using BASE_CR would be safe against possible structure changes and rearrangements Cc: Marvin Häuser

Provided support for symlink file type. Added routine which allows reading and following them through recursive open() call. As a security meausure implemented simple symlink loop check with nest

Hi all, This patchset adds symbolic links support with simple recursion protection based on symbolic link nest level limitation, also I included patch which adds BASE_CR to extract EXT4_FILE private

This changes tends to improve security of code sections by fixing integer overflows, missing aligment checks, unsafe casts, also simplified some routines, fixed compiler warnings and corrected

Hi all, This is second version of patch in which I squashed commits into one. Here attempts to improve security of code sections by fixing integer overflows, missing aligment checks, unsafe casts.

Adds 4-byte aligned check for superblock group descriptor size field Cc: Marvin Häuser <mhaeuser@...> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@...> Cc: Vitaly Cheptsov

Seems that returning maximum uintn in case of bad block was a mistake, so return just bad block type Cc: Marvin Häuser <mhaeuser@...> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@...> Cc: Vitaly

Cc: Marvin Häuser <mhaeuser@...> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@...> Cc: Vitaly Cheptsov <vit9696@...> Signed-off-by: Savva Mitrofanov <savvamtr@...> ---

First of all BASE_LIST_FOR_EACH_SAFE doesn't have any sanity checks. So its usage isn't "safe". We can drop this loop and use just IsNodeInList Cc: Marvin Häuser <mhaeuser@...> Cc: Pedro

Field name_len has type CHAR8, while filename limit is 255 (EXT4_NAME_MAX), so because structure EXT4_DIR_ENTRY would be unchangeable in future, we could drop this check without any assertions Cc: